Seeking Compassion in Dying: The Washington
State Law Against Assisted Suicide
Edward J. Larson*
In May of 1994, federal district Judge Barbara Rothstein ruled in
Compassion in Dying v. Washington' that certain terminally-ill adults
have a constitutional right to commit physician-assisted suicide. Six
months later, Oregon voters narrowly approved a ballot initiative
allowing certain terminally-ill adults to obtain physicians' prescriptions
for lethal drugs.2 These parallel legal actions moved the Pacific
Northwest to center stage in the growing national debate over
physician-assisted suicide (in which doctors supply patients with drugs
or other means to commit suicide), and euthanasia (in which doctors
administer a life-ending medication or procedure).
From a constitutional standpoint, the decision by Judge Rothstein
is more significant than the Oregon initiative because her reasoning
calls into question statutes against assisted suicide that are currently in
effect in most American states and are part of traditional AngloAmerican law.3 Her ruling goes far beyond the Oregon initiative (now
the Death With Dignity Act), which created a narrow statutory
exception in the law against assisted suicide.4 It establishes a broad,
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1. 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1467 (W.D. Wash. 1994), rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995).
2. Voters in Oregon Allow Doctors To Help the Terminally Ill Die, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11,
1994, at A12.
3. These laws are reviewed in ALAN MIESEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE 60-61 (Supp. No. 1
1994).
4. The Oregon Death With Dignity Act, reprinted in Kane v. Kulongoski, 871 P.2d 993,
1001-06 (Or. 1994). The narrowness of this exception is suggested by the section of the act that
provides:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize a physician or any other person to
end a patient's life by lethal injection, mercy killing or active euthanasia. Actions taken
in accordance with this Act shall not, for any purpose, constitute suicide, assistedsuicide,
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new constitutional right that will restrict legislative efforts to address
this controversial social issue. The decision was unprecedented; nos
prior court had limited a state's authority to outlaw assisted suicide.
And it is unfortunate: By failing to properly balance the relevant
issues at stake, the decision in Compassion in Dying threatens to make
a mockery of its name by increasing the vulnerability of elderly and
infirm patients without demonstrably aiding those who might
independently choose death. Relying heavily on this point and raising
several other serious concerns, the Ninth Circuit federal court of
appeals reversed Judge Rothstein's holding in a split decision issued
after this Article was written and initially edited.6
I.

THE WASHINGTON STATUTE

The ruling involved a Washington State statute that is similar to
laws in most other American jurisdictions. Like most other states,
Washington does not criminalize suicide or attempted suicide. Rather,
the law proscribes aiding or causing the suicide of another. It
provides, in pertinent part, "[a] person is guilty of promoting a suicide
attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt
suicide."7 This is a broad prohibition. Nothing in the statute focuses
on physicians as actors or on the terminally ill as recipients. It was
intended to protect life and discourage suicide without regard to a
patient's condition.' Although a statute of this type has been on
Washington's books since the region first became a territory, its
current wording reflects the influence of the Model Penal Code, which
included a strict ban against assisted suicide as a means to protect life
in general."

mercy killing or homicide, under the law.
Id. § 3.14, 871 P.2d at 1004 (emphasis added).
5. Judge Rothstein acknowledged this in a footnote, where she wrote, "[t]he court is aware
of no other federal cases directly addressing the issue raised in this case." Compassion in Dying,
850 F. Supp. at 1462 n.5.
6. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 592 (9th Cir. 1995).
7. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060(1) (1994). Thirty states currently outlaw assisted suicide

by statute. MIESEL, supra note 3, at 60-61 (Supp. No. 1 1994).
8. See MODEL PENAL CODE justification discussed infra note 9.
9. The original Washington territorial law against assisted suicide was included within the
territory's initial criminal statute, which was the second bill passed by the first territorial
legislature. 1854 Wash. Laws 78, § 17. The text of the MODEL PENAL CODE provision on
assisted suicide is in § 210.5(2), with the rationale for that provision discussed in comment 5.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5(2) cmt. 5 (1962). In the past thirty years, following the
publication of the MODEL PENAL CODE, eight states passed new statutes specifically outlawing
assisted suicide and eleven other states, including Washington in 1975, revised their existing
statutes. Thomas Marzen et al., Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 86, 100
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Before Judge Rothstein's recent decision, there was no hint in any
published decision that Washington's law against assisted suicide or
others like it were unconstitutional. Indeed, contrary to the implications of Judge Rothstein's decision, the U.S. Supreme Court in its 1990
decision involving the right to die, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Department of Health,'0 suggested that laws against assisted suicide
were constitutional. Cruzan itself involved a federal constitutional
challenge to a state requirement that the termination of life-sustaining
medical treatment required clear and convincing evidence of the
patient's wish to have treatment ended. In her decision, Judge
Rothstein wrote:
In Cruzan, the Supreme Court considered whether a competent
person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing
unwanted life sustaining medical treatment including artificiallydelivered food and water essential to life. In his majority opinion,
Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that this principle "may be inferred
from our prior decisions," and that "the logic of the cases ... would
embrace such a liberty interest." He then assumed for the purposes
of the case before the Court that the United States Constitution
would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to
refuse life-sustaining hydration and nutrition."
Judge Rothstein went on to ask "whether a constitutional
distinction can be drawn" between the situation in Cruzan involving
the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment and the case of a
competent, terminally-ill patient who wants to hasten death with a
doctor's aid.12 "In other words," she added, "is there a difference for
purposes of finding a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest between
refusal of unwanted treatment, which will result in death, and
committing physician-assisted suicide in the final stage of life?" 3
Judge Rothstein answered this question in the negative without
noting that the Cruzan Court implied that its answer would be
positive. As if qualifying its statement suggesting that patients have
a right to refuse treatment, the Supreme Court added, "moreover, the
majority of States in this country have laws imposing criminal penalties
on one who assists another to commit suicide. We do not think a State
is required to remain neutral in the face of an informed and voluntary

(1985).
10. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
11. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1461 (ellipses in original) (citations omitted).
12. Id.
13. Id.
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decision by a physically able adult to starve to death."' 4 This
observation suggests that the Supreme Court would uphold a clean bar
against assisted suicide, such as the Washington State statute or the
Model Penal Code provision, and that there is a constitutionally
meaningful line between a patient's right to refuse medical treatment
and his or her demand for assistance in committing suicide.
II.

LIBERTY INTERESTS V. STATE INTERESTS

The Supreme Court's comment in Cruzan about laws against
assisted suicide is especially important for assessing Compassion in
Dying because Judge Rothstein relied heavily on that Supreme Court
decision to justify her holding. In particular, Cruzan provided
authority for Judge Rothstein's finding that a terminally-ill person has
a "liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment" of the
U.S. Constitution in choosing "to end his or her suffering and hasten
Rothstein then jumped, without further
an inevitable death."'"
analysis, to the legal conclusion "that a competent, terminally-ill adult
has a constitutionally guaranteed right under the Fourteenth Amendment to commit physician-assisted suicide."' 6 The Cruzan Court did
not proceed this way. After inferring that "a competent person has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment," the Cruzan Court stated:
But determiningthat a person has a "liberty interest" under the Due
Process Clause does not end the inquiry; "whether respondent's
constitutional rights have been violated must be determined by
balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state interests."' 7
Under this approach, individual liberty interests are less than
absolute rights, and must be balanced against competing societal
interests to determine whether they prevail.'" This balancing should
be done at the outset, to determine if a constitutional right exists,
rather than later, as Judge Rothstein did here, simply to determine if
a challenged statute imposes an undue burden on an established
constitutional right.' 9 Further, Judge Rothstein's belated balancing
rigged both sides of the scales in favor of physician-assisted suicide.

14. Cvuzan, 497 U.S. at 280.
15. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1461.
16. Id. at 1462.
17. Ciuzan, 497 U.S. at 279 (citations omitted).
18. See id.
19. Judge Rothstein followed the latter approach in Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at
1462-66.
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Judge Rothstein exaggerated the weight of the liberty interest at
stake. In defining the relevant liberty interest, she stated:
There is no more profoundly personal decision, nor one which is
closer to the heart of personal liberty, than the choice which a
terminally ill person makes to end his or her suffering and hasten an
inevitable death.20
Even assuming that this is true-and it appears to be a subjective
observation-it does not answer the question of whether a terminallyill person has a profound personal liberty interest in committing
physician-assisted suicide. To make this connection, evidence should
demonstrate that the person needs physician assistance to exercise his
or her liberty interest in hastening death. If the evidence shows that
a terminally-ill person can easily hasten death without a physician's
assistance, such as by using traditional suicide methods or drug
information readily available in the popular literature, 21 then a law
against physician-assisted suicide would not significantly burden the
person's liberty interest. At most, the law would discourage people
from choosing death, which the state is clearly free to do. 2 If the
evidence shows that most people who need a physician's assistance to
commit suicide are physically unable to self-administer drugs, and
therefore require lethal injections or other forms of active euthanasia,
then Judge Rothstein's narrowly limited decision to allow "terminallyill adult patients to hasten death by prescribingsuitable medication for
self-administration by the patient, '23 rather than to permit physicianadministered euthanasia, would not significantly advance their liberty
interests.24 In either event, Judge Rothstein's decision would lack
justification. In fact, the justification necessary to connect a terminally-ill person's liberty interest in hastening death with physician-assisted
suicide is utterly absent from the written opinion. The opinion simply
jumps from one to the other.

20. Id. at 1461.

21. For example, suicide methods for the terminally ill are outlined in the best selling and
widely available book, DEREK HUMPHREY, FINAL EXIT: THE PRACTICALITIES OF SELFDELIVERANCE AND ASSISTED SUICIDE FOR THE DYING (1991).
22. For an analogous situation, see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2816, 2821
(1992), where the opinion of the Court provides that the state is free "to persuade the woman to
choose childbirth over abortion" and "show its concern for life" prior to fetal viability even
though the woman maintains a constitutional right to obtain an abortion.
23. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1459 (emphasis added).
24. In the Netherlands, where both physician-assisted suicide and physician-administered

euthanasia are widely practiced, euthanasia is far more common than assisted suicide. See DAVID
CUNDIFF, EUTHANASIA Is NOT THE ANSWER: A HOSPICE PHYSICIAN'S VIEW 102 (1992).
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Judge Rothstein also diminished the weight of the relevant state
interests that support a law against physician-assisted suicide.2" In its
defense of the statute, the state claimed an interest in preventing undue
influence, duress, abuse, and mistake in the commission of physicianassisted suicide. Dismissing this defense, Judge Rothstein wrote that
"protecting people from committing suicide due to undue influence or
duress is also unquestionably a legitimate interest. But it is undisputed
that plaintiffs in this case are mentally competent individuals who have
reached a decision to commit physician-assisted suicide free from any
undue influence." 26 However, her decision was not limited to the
plaintiffs before the court, whose mental states were subject to judicial
review. Her decision overturned the law against assisted suicide for
everyone, without requiring judicial oversight of a patient's mental
competence or other legal safeguards against undue influence.27
Moreover, after noting that Washington State law allows individuals
to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, Judge Rothstein added,
"[t]he potential risk of abuse and undue influence is often just as great
and may be greater in certain cases for a patient who requests to be
disconnected from a life support system. '"28 But Judge Rothstein
provided no evidence to support her opinion on this point, and her
logic is far from self-evident given the obvious physical differences
between persons who do and do not need ongoing medical treatment
just to stay alive.
There is good reason for concern about the risk of undue influence
in the administration of lethal drugs, especially when dealing with the
University of Michigan constitutional-law expert Yale
elderly.
Kamisar analyzed the inevitable risk of unintended undue influence in
this context. "'Ageism,"' he wrote "the prejudices and stereotypes
applied to the elderly solely on the basis of their age-may manifest
itself in a failure to recognize treatable depression, a refusal to take an
aggressive approach to pain management, the view that an elderly
person's desire to commit suicide is more 'rational' than a younger
patient's would be."29 Ageism could lead physicians to accept
25. This side of the balance is discussed more fully in Yale Kamisar, Are Laws Against
Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional?,23 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 32, 38-39 (1993); and Edward J.
Larson, Prescriptionfor Death: A Second Opinion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 1995).
26. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1465.
27. Id. at 1467. Indeed, two of the three terminally-ill plaintiffs died before Judge Rothstein
issued her decision. Id. at 1456 n.2.
28. Id. at 1467.
29. Kamisar, supra note 25, at 39. For an early presentation of Kamisar's views on this
issue, see Yale Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed 'Mercy-Killing' Legislation,
42 MINN. L. REV. 969 (1958).
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physician-assisted suicide by physically ill senior citizens without
sufficient investigation of their motives. In a recent book on suicide
cited by Kamisar, George Colt observed, "[a]lthough we shrink from
the idea of elderly suicide and euthanasia, we encourage it by our
neglect and indifference."3 Similarly, sociologist Menno Boldt wrote,
"[s]uicidal persons are succumbing to what they experience as an
overpowering and unrelenting coercion in their environment to cease
living.131 This sense of coercion could be increased by condoning
physician-assisted suicide. In her analysis of the related issue of
euthanasia, ethicist Sissela Bok concluded that "the possibility of
abuses and errors," especially in cases involving the "senile" or the
"powerless," outweigh the potential benefits of the practice for some
32
compelling cases.
Based on such expert testimony, state legislators reasonably could
find that this coercion might intensify in a state that sanctioned
physician-assisted suicide. Indeed, legislators could conclude that, if
physician-assisted suicide becomes legal, freely discussed, and openly
practiced, more people, especially the infirm and the elderly, will see
it as the socially accepted way to save society, their families, and
themselves from the burdens of old age and serious illness. Yet it is
up to legislatures and the public to establish such societal norms, as
Oregon did, rather than for federal courts to impose them by judicial
fiat. Washington state voters considered the legalization of physicianassisted suicide in 1991, and rejected it.33 Even if legislators could
not prove that legalizing physician-assisted suicide for the terminally
ill would unduly encourage these and other people to take their own
lives, and increase the likelihood of duress and mistake in this context,
they surely have a reasonable basis for addressing these concerns by
outlawing the procedure. Indeed, this state interest should be great
enough to sustain the statute unless it can be protected adequately in
some less burdensome way. Judge Rothstein's decision failed to make
this calculation other than by simply professing that the legislature
could still "devise regulations" designed to prevent "abuse, coercion or
undue influence from third parties" in the practice of assisted

30. GEORGE COLT, THE ENIGMA OF SUICIDE 394 (1991), cited in Karnisar, supra note 25,

at 39.
31. Kamisar, supra note 25, at 39.
32. Sisala Bok, Euthanasiaand the Care of the Dying, in ThE DILEMMAS OF EUTHANASIA
1, 8-9 (John A. Behnke & Sissla Bok eds. 1975).
33. See Jane Gross, Voters Turn Down Mercy Killing Idea, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1991, at
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suicide.34 Yet her ruling struck down just such a regulation, and she
did not suggest any workable alternative.
III. EQUAL PROTECTION FOR UNEQUAL ACTS
Judge Rothstein's holding did not rest solely on the liberty
interests of the terminally ill. It also invoked claims to equal protection. As she explained:
Plaintiffs in this case contend that Washington State law unconstitutionally distinguishes between two similarly situated groups of
terminally-ill adults. Under current state law, those terminally ill
persons whose condition involves the use of life-sustaining equipment may lawfully obtain medical assistance in terminating such
treatment, including food and water, and thereby hasten death,
while those who also suffer from terminal illnesses, but whose
treatment does not involve the use of life support systems are denied
the option of hastening death with medical assistance.s
In short, plaintiffs equated a dying patient whose life is being
prolonged through medical treatment with a terminally-ill person who
remains able to live without treatment. Without providing any
authority for her holding on this crucial point, Judge Rothstein
concluded, "[t]he court finds the two groups of mentally competent,
terminally-ill adults at issue here to be similarly situated." 36 Of
course, as the Ninth Circuit would later note when reversing Judge
Rothstein's ruling,37 this conclusion ignores the many situations in
which the law distinguishes between an action that causes a result and
a failure to act in a situation which foreseeably leads to a similar
result.38
The lack of authority for equating the two groups at issue here is
particularly telling in this context because it involves a central issue in
Although some modern medical ethicists and
medical ethics.
physicians agree with Judge Rothstein's conclusion,3 9 the great weight
of authority maintains that there is a fundamental difference between
allowing patients to die by withdrawing or withholding medical
treatment and hastening death through a medical intervention. This
distinction dates at least as far back in Western medical tradition as the

Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1465 n.10.
Id. at 1466.
Id. at 1467.
Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 593-94.
38. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. PROSSER, PROSSER ON THE LAW Of TORTS § 54 (3rd ed. 1964).
39. E.g., Marcia Angel, Euthanasia,319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1348, 1350 (1988).
34.
35.
36.
37.
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ancient Hippocratic Oath.40 Referring to this Oath, the U.S. Supreme
Court, in Roe v. Wade, observed, "[i]t represents the apex of the
development of strict [ethical] concepts in medicine, and its influence
endures to this day."141 Under the Hippocratic Oath, which is
attributed to the 4th century B.C. Greek physician Hippocrates, a
physician may refrain from treating patients but may never prescribe
any "deadly medicine," even if asked.4 2
The major Anglo-American medical associations vigorously
maintain this distinction today. Thus, for example, the American
Medical Association condemns physician-assisted suicide as "contrary
to that for which the medical profession stands" while it condones the
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment if it conforms to "the decision
of the patient and/or his immediate family."43 The British Medical
Association assumed a similar stance in its 1988 Euthanasia Report,
which concluded, "[t]here is a distinction between an active intervention by a doctor to terminate
life and a decision not to prolong life (a
44
nontreatment decision).
Medical ethicists endorse this distinction. For example, the
Hastings Center, America's preeminent institute for the study of
medical ethics, concluded in a 1987 report that helped shape the right
to refuse life-sustaining treatment:
Some persons who accept this right of patients to decide to forgo
treatment are concerned nevertheless that the values supporting it,
and in particular self-determination, necessarily imply that voluntary
euthanasia and assisted suicide are also justified. We disagree.
Medical tradition and customary practice distinguish in a broadly
accepted fashion between the refusal of medical
intervention and
45
intentionally causing death by assisting suicide.

40. The text of the Hippocratic Oath is widely reprinted. The source used for purposes of
this Article is Hippocratic Oath, in 12 COLLIER'S ENCYCLOPEDIA 137 (1994).
41. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 131 (1973).
42. HippocraticOath, supra note 40, at 137. For commentary on this distinction, see Willard
Gaylin et al., Doctors Must Not Kill, 259 JAMA 2139, 2139 (1988).
43. This statement is quoted from a 1973 resolution of the American Medical Association
House of Delegates and is reprinted in Thomas D. Sullivan, Active and Passive Euthanasia: An
Impertinent Distinction?, in EUTHANASIA: THE MORAL ISSUE 53, 54 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart
E. Rosenbaum eds., 1989). For reference to a similar position taken by the Judicial Council of
the American Medical Association in 1986, see Gaylin, supra note 42, at 2139.
44. Conclusions of a British Medical Association Review of Guidelines on Euthanasia, in
EUTHANASIA: THE MORAL ISSUE, supra note 43, at 155.
45. HASTINGS CENTER, GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT AND THE CARE OF THE DYING 129 (1987).
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Four of America's premier physician-ethicists, Willard Gaylin, Leon
R. Kass, Edmund D. Pellegrino, and Mark Siegler, jointly declared,
"[g]enerations of physicians and commentators on medical ethics have
underscored and held fast to the distinction between ceasing useless
treatments (or allowing to die) and active, willful, taking of life."46
In a statement that utterly denounces Judge Rothstein's position, these
four influential scholars added, "[n]either legal tolerance nor the best
bedside manner can ever make medical killings medically ethical."47
An exhaustive study of the issue by the official New York State Task
Force on Life and the Law reached a similar conclusion in 1994.4"
Given the overwhelming weight of medical and ethical authority
against her position, it was tactful of Judge Rothstein not to cite any
basis (other than the plaintiffs' complaint) for equating physicianassisted suicide with terminating life-sustaining medical treatment.
Physicians and medical ethicists typically view the two situations as
fundamentally different, and no amount of subtle judicial writing can
make it appear otherwise. The only evidence that Judge Rothstein
offered in support of her equal-protection holding was the irrelevant
observation that Washington State law permits patients to refuse lifesustaining treatment. "Thus," she reasoned, "the State has already
recognized that its interest in preventing suicide does not require an
absolute ban."49 Of course, Washington State does not ban suicide-the state simply tries to discourage it through a law against
assisted suicide. Further, the state law she cited, the Washington
Natural Death Act, expressly provides that the termination of lifesustaining treatment under the Act "shall not, for any purpose,
constitute a suicide ... " which suggests that the lawmakers did not
intend to equate refusing life-sustaining treatment with suicide. 0
Moreover, that Act incorporates an absolute ban against "mercy

46. Gaylin, supra note 42, at 2139.
47. Id.
48. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH ISSOUGHT;
ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT (1994). Also in 1994, in the
litigation spawned by Dr. Jack Kevorkian's practice of physician-assisted suicide, a Michigan
appellate court accepted this distinction in the context of considering the constitutionality of a
state law against assisted suicide. Hobbins v. Attorney General, 518 N.W.2d 487, 493 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1994), affd in part, rev'd in part, remanded, People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714
(Mich. 1994), cert. denied sub norm., Hobbins v. Kelley, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995).
49. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1467 (W.D. Wash. 1994),
rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995).
50. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.070(1) (1994).
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2
killing," 51 which presumably includes physician-assisted suicide.
Finally, as noted above, mainstream medical and ethical opinion does
not equate terminating life-sustaining treatment with assisted suicide.
As the 1987 Hastings Center report concluded, "a reasonable, if not
unambiguous, line can be drawn between foregoing life-sustaining
treatment on the one hand, and active euthanasia or assisted suicide on
the other." 3 Judge Rothstein ignored this line and wrongly ordered
the state to do likewise.

IV.

CONCLUSIONS

Terminally-ill persons may have a liberty interest in committing
physician-assisted suicide. Certainly there is some apparent similarity
between a terminally-ill person who no longer wishes to prolong his or
her life through medical technology and one who wishes to hasten his
or her death through lethal drugs. This similarity may support a
legislative enactment authorizing physicians to prescribe lethal drugs,
like the Oregon initiative. In 1991, however, voters in Washington
State rejected a less-restrictive initiative that would have generally
authorized physician-assisted suicide. 4 Judge Rothstein's decision
provided an insufficient constitutional basis to overrule this judgment
of the people-to do by judicial fiat what they chose not to do by
legislation. The decision fails to seriously address either the societal
interests served by outlawing physician-assisted suicide or the widely
accepted distinction between refusing medical treatment and prescribing lethal drugs. Constitutional jurisprudence, especially an unprecedented decision to overturn a long-established statute, requires a
stronger justification than the text of this decision provides."3

51. Id. § 70.112.100 (1994).
52. Of course, Washington State expressly bans all forms of assisted suicide. WASH. REV.
CODE § 9A.36.060 (1994).
53. HASTINGS CENTER, supra note 45, at 6.
54. See Jane Gross, supra note 33, at B16.
55. See, for example, the extensive analysis and justification employed by the Supreme Court
intwo landmark decisions involving long-established statutes that profoundly impacted society:
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (barring school segregation); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (legalizing abortion).

